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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Roger Vanderklok wanted to fly from Philadelphia to 
Miami, where he intended to run a half-marathon.  In his 
carry-on luggage, he had a heart monitor and watch stored 
inside a piece of PVC pipe that was capped on both ends.  
During screening at the airport security checkpoint, the pipe 
and electronics prompted secondary screening, supervised by 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employee 
Charles Kieser.  According to Vanderklok, Kieser was 
disrespectful and aggressive, so Vanderklok stated an intent 
to file a complaint against him.  Vanderklok claims that 
Kieser, in retaliation, called the Philadelphia police and 
falsely reported that Vanderklok had threatened to bring a 
bomb to the airport.  Based on Kieser’s statement, 
Vanderklok was arrested.  He was later acquitted of all 
criminal charges when Kieser’s testimony about 
Vanderklok’s behavior did not match airport surveillance 
footage.  Vanderklok then brought this suit against Kieser and 
others, asserting numerous statutory and constitutional 
violations.   
 
Kieser moved for summary judgment, arguing, among 
other things, that he was entitled to qualified immunity on 
Vanderklok’s First Amendment claim and that Vanderklok 
had failed to make out a Fourth Amendment claim on the 
merits.  The United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania concluded that Kieser lacked 
qualified immunity as to Vanderklok’s First Amendment 
claim and that a reasonable jury could find in Vanderklok’s 
favor as to his Fourth Amendment claim.  It therefore denied 
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the summary judgment motion.  Kieser filed this interlocutory 
appeal.   
 
Because Kieser sought and was denied summary 
judgment on the merits of Vanderklok’s Fourth Amendment 
claim, rather than on the basis of qualified immunity, that 
claim cannot be reviewed on interlocutory appeal.  By 
contrast, Kieser’s appeal of the denial of qualified immunity 
as to Vanderklok’s First Amendment claim is properly before 
us.  As it turns out, however, a preliminary and dispositive 
question must be answered first: whether a First Amendment 
claim against a TSA employee for retaliatory prosecution 
even exists in the context of airport security screenings.  
Because we conclude that it does not, we will vacate the 
District Court’s order, without reaching the issue of qualified 
immunity, and direct the District Court to enter judgment for 
Kieser on the First Amendment claim.   
   
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Factual Background1 
 
In January 2013, Vanderklok, a gentleman in his late 
fifties, arrived at the Philadelphia International Airport, 
intending to travel to Miami to participate in a half-marathon.  
He entered the passenger screening area, where his carry-on 
bag was x-rayed by TSA personnel.  The x-ray images 
                                              
1 In reviewing the District Court’s denial of qualified 
immunity, we are required to take the facts in the light most 
favorable to Vanderklok.  Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 
(2007).   
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revealing his heart monitor and watch, stored in a short length 
of PVC pipe, triggered secondary screening of his bag.     
 
Vanderklok was directed to the secondary screening 
area, where TSA screeners manually examined his bag and its 
contents.  At this point in the story, the parties’ versions of 
events diverge dramatically.  Kieser, a TSA supervisor and 
the last remaining defendant in this case, left his supervisory 
station and came to the secondary screening area to observe 
the line agent’s examination of Vanderklok’s bag.  
Vanderklok maintains that at all times he was patient and not 
agitated during the secondary screening but that Kieser was 
agitated and argumentative throughout.  Kieser asserts 
essentially the opposite: that Vanderklok was belligerent 
during the secondary search.  In Kieser’s telling, Vanderklok 
said, “I could bring a bomb through here any day I want and 
you’ll never find it.”  (JA 8.)  Vanderklok denies making that 
or any similar statement.  He says that Kieser fabricated the 
statement after Vanderklok asked for a complaint form and 
stated his intention to report Kieser’s behavior.  There were 
no other known witnesses to Vanderklok’s alleged statement.  
Once the secondary screening was complete, Vanderklok’s 
bag and all of its original contents, other than the PVC pipe, 
were returned.  Vanderklok then exited the security 
checkpoint area and began to rearrange his bag.   
 
As Vanderklok exited the screening area, Kieser called 
an airport police officer to report the statement Vanderklok 
allegedly made about a bomb.  Officer Pinkney of the 
Philadelphia Police Department approached Vanderklok 
outside the screening area approximately five minutes after 
Vanderklok had requested the complaint form.  Based on 
Kieser’s claim that Vanderklok had made a bomb threat, 
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Pinkney and another officer took Vanderklok into custody, 
placing him in a holding cell at the airport police station.  
Detective Wojciechowski, also of the Philadelphia Police 
Department, was assigned to further investigate.  He spoke 
with Kieser, who repeated that Vanderklok made a bomb 
threat and was “irate” and “loud” during the secondary 
screening.2  (JA 311.)  After a brief investigation, 
Wojciechowski recommended that Vanderklok be charged 
with disorderly conduct and threatening placement of a bomb.  
The District Attorney approved those charges and eventually 
added a third charge for making terroristic threats.  
Vanderklok was handcuffed and transported to a nearby 
police station where he was held until making a first 
appearance and posting bond.   
 
Vanderklok was tried in the Philadelphia Court of 
Common Pleas on April 8, 2013.  During that trial, the only 
witness produced by the Commonwealth was TSA agent 
Kieser.  Kieser testified on direct examination that 
Vanderklok was agitated and waved his arms in the air 
repeatedly during the secondary screening.  On cross 
examination, he further elaborated on his assertion that 
Vanderklok was physically disruptive at the checkpoint.  
Surveillance video of almost the entire interaction was played 
during the cross examination of Officer Pinkney and Kieser’s 
testimony was shown to be largely inconsistent with the 
video.  After the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, Vanderklok 
                                              
2 Detective Wojciechowski’s investigative report 
shows that Officer Pinkney’s original detention of 
Vanderklok and the formal charges against him were based 




made a motion for judgment of acquittal on all counts, which 
was granted.   
 
 B. Procedural Background 
 
Following his acquittal, Vanderklok brought suit in the 
District Court against Kieser, the United States, the TSA, the 
City of Philadelphia, and various police officers.  In his 
Amended Complaint, Vanderklok asserted nine claims: (1) 
unconstitutional search and seizure in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics;3 (2) 
unconstitutional infringement of the freedom of speech in 
violation of the First Amendment, under § 1983 and Bivens; 
(3) false arrest, under Pennsylvania law and the Federal Tort 
Claims Act (“FTCA”); (4) false imprisonment, under 
Pennsylvania law and the FTCA; (5) assault and battery, 
under Pennsylvania law and the FTCA; (6) constitutional 
deprivations by the City of Philadelphia, under Monell v. 
Department of Social Services;4 (7) malicious prosecution in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, under Pennsylvania law, 
the FTCA, and § 1983; (8) retaliatory prosecution in violation 
                                              
3 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971) (holding that a remedy is 
available for a federal agent’s violation of a citizen’s Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from warrantless searches and 
seizures).   
 
4 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (holding that a 
municipality is subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when a 
constitutional deprivation is the result of a policy or custom 




of the Fourth Amendment, under Pennsylvania law, the 
FTCA, and § 1983; and (9) violations of due process rights, 
under the Fourteenth Amendment and the FTCA.   
 
The police officers and the City of Philadelphia 
responded with a motion to dismiss.  The District Court 
granted the motion as to the police officers, holding that they 
had probable cause to arrest Vanderklok and, even if they did 
not, they were protected by qualified immunity.  Vanderklok 
v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 3d 373, 385 (E.D. Pa. 2015).  
Then, after dismissing the claims against the police officers, 
the Court held that, “[w]ithout an underlying constitutional 
violation, Vanderklok’s Monell claim [against the City of 
Philadelphia] must similarly be dismissed.”  Id. at 387.   
 
The claims under the FTCA, in addition to being 
brought against individual defendants, were asserted against 
the United States.  The United States moved to substitute 
itself in place of those individual defendants and then moved 
to dismiss all claims against itself, citing sovereign immunity.  
Vanderklok v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 3d 356, 360 (E.D. 
Pa. 2015), appeal dismissed (Feb. 8, 2016).  The District 
Court granted those motions, and therefore all of the state tort 
claims were dismissed.  Id. at 358. 
 
None of those rulings are before us now.5  Vanderklok 
v. United States, No. CV 15-00370, 2015 WL 12844282, at 
                                              
5 Vanderklok moved under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(b) to certify the orders of dismissal for appeal.  
That rule permits district courts to “direct entry of final 
judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or 
parties … if the court expressly determines that there is no 
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*2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 2015).  Only Vanderklok’s First 
Amendment retaliatory prosecution claim and his Fourth 
Amendment malicious prosecution claim are left, and only as 
to Kieser.6  Kieser had moved for summary judgment on 
those claims too, but the District Court denied that motion.  
As to the First Amendment retaliatory prosecution claim, the 
Court first determined that such a cause of action does exist, 
relying on Bivens.  It then concluded that Kieser was not 
entitled to qualified immunity from that claim.  As to the 
Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, the Court 
addressed the merits and determined that there was a material 
dispute of fact that precluded summary judgment.   
 




“[W]e normally do not entertain appeals from a district 
court order denying a motion for summary judgment because 
such orders do not put an end to the litigation.”  Rivas v. City 
of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 2004).  But a special 
                                                                                                     
just reason for delay.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).  The District 
Court denied certification.  Vanderklok v. United States, No. 
CV 15-00370, 2015 WL 12844282, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 
2015).  
 
6 The District Court granted partial summary judgment 
to Kieser on Vanderklok’s Fourth Amendment 
unconstitutional search and seizure claim because Vanderklok 
did not oppose Kieser’s motion on that claim.  Vanderklok v. 
United States, No. CV 15-00370, 2016 WL 4366976, at *1 
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2016). 
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class of rulings called “collateral orders” escape that general 
practice.  Id.  We will hear interlocutory appeals from such 
orders because they “(i) conclusively determine the disputed 
issue, (ii) resolve an important issue entirely separate from 
the merits of the lawsuit, and (iii) cannot be effectively 
reviewed on appeal from a final judgment.”  Id.   
 
Included within the classification of “collateral orders” 
is a denial of “a defendant’s motion for summary judgment 
… so long as: (1) the defendant is a public official asserting a 
qualified immunity defense; and (2) the issue on appeal is 
whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff demonstrate a 
violation of clearly established federal law, not which facts 
the plaintiff might be able to prove at trial.”  Id. (emphasis 
removed) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 
(1985)).  Excepted from that classification is an order denying 
summary judgment that, “though entered in a ‘qualified 
immunity’ case, determines only a question of ‘evidence 
sufficiency,’ i.e., which facts a party may, or may not, be able 
to prove at trial.”  Id. at 192 (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 
U.S. 304, 313 (1995)).  Here, the only properly appealable 
issues are the ones related to the District Court’s denial of 
qualified immunity on Vanderklok’s First Amendment claim.   
 
The Court denied Kieser’s motion for summary 
judgment on that claim after concluding that the law does 
provide for such a claim and that Kieser was not entitled to 
qualified immunity with respect to it.  The qualified immunity 
dispute centers on whether a First Amendment right to be free 
from retaliation by a TSA employee was clearly established at 
the time of the incident in question.  That is exactly the type 
of issue we have jurisdiction to review, because qualified 
immunity is immunity from suit altogether and thus “cannot 
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be effectively vindicated after the trial has occurred.”  
Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525.  And since the issue of whether a 
cause of action even exists against a TSA employee for First 
Amendment retaliation is a threshold question of law, we 
have jurisdiction to consider that as well.  See Wilkie v. 
Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 549 n.4 (2007) (explaining that the 
existence of a cause of action is “directly implicated by the 
defense of qualified immunity and properly before us on 
interlocutory appeal” (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 
250, 257 n.5 (2006))).   
 
We do not, however, have jurisdiction over Kieser’s 
appeal to the extent that it challenges the District Court’s 
denial of summary judgment as to Vanderklok’s Fourth 
Amendment malicious prosecution claim.  Kieser attempts to 
add a jurisdictional hook to his Fourth Amendment challenge 
by arguing that, because there is no way for him to be liable 
on the present record, he “remains qualifiedly immune.”  
(Opening Br. at 30.)  More particularly, he argues that “[t]he 
District Court’s denial of qualified immunity at the summary 
judgment stage fundamentally misapplied the premise that the 
existence of probable cause will not insulate a defendant from 
liability if that defendant can be shown to have fabricated the 
predicate for that probable cause.”  (Id. at 31.)   
 
Whatever the merit of that argument, it ignores that 
Kieser did not seek a qualified immunity ruling from the 
District Court on the Fourth Amendment malicious 
prosecution claim, and thus the Court did not adjudicate the 
qualified immunity issue.  Kieser instead argued in the 
District Court that there was a lack of sufficient admissible 
evidence to support that constitutional claim.  A reading of 
the District Court’s thorough opinion confirms that the Court 
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denied summary judgment based on material disputes of fact 
essential to the elements of Vanderklok’s Fourth Amendment 
malicious prosecution claim, including that Kieser lacked 
probable cause.  At no point in the Court’s discussion of that 
claim did the issue of qualified immunity arise.   
 
Kieser’s failure to obtain a qualified immunity ruling 
from the District Court is not simply a waiver problem that 
we can overlook, as he seems to hope.  The fact that he was 
denied summary judgment on the merits of that Fourth 
Amendment claim rather than on qualified immunity grounds 
deprives us of jurisdiction on interlocutory appeal, and we 
have no discretion to overlook that.  His argument that we 
should consider qualified immunity on that claim because it 
serves judicial economy similarly fails.  Judicial economy 
gives us no warrant to extend our jurisdiction past its set 
limits.7   
 
In sum, our jurisdiction at this point extends only to 
the issue of whether Kieser ought to be immune from suit for 
Vanderklok’s First Amendment retaliation claim, and, 
                                              
7 Even if Kieser had properly raised the issue of 
qualified immunity, we would still be without jurisdiction to 
review it because that issue would turn on the disputed facts 
of the case decided by the District Court.  See Rivas v. City of 
Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[W]e lack 
jurisdiction to consider whether the district court correctly 
identified the set of facts … sufficient to establish a violation 
of a clearly established constitutional right.” (quoting 
Ziccardi v. City of Philadelphia, 288 F.3d 57, 61 (3d Cir. 
2002))).   
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preliminary to that, whether such a claim exists at all in the 
specific circumstances of this case.   
 
III. DISCUSSION  
 
A. The Expansion of Bivens Actions to New 
Contexts is Strictly Limited. 
 
It may help at the outset to examine the development 
of implied rights of action, to establish the perspective we 
must take in evaluating Vanderklok’s First Amendment 
retaliation claim.  The Supreme Court first implied a private 
right of action for damages for a deprivation of constitutional 
rights by federal officers in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971).  Thus, such actions brought directly under the 
Constitution against federal officials have become known as 
“Bivens actions.”  The authority of federal courts “to imply a 
new constitutional tort, not expressly authorized by statute, is 
anchored in our general jurisdiction to decide all cases 
‘arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States.’”  Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 
(2001) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331).  It is, however, an 
authority rarely invoked.  In Bivens itself, the Supreme Court 
implied a private right of action under the Fourth 
Amendment.  403 U.S. at 389.  Since Bivens, such actions 
have been recognized under the Fifth Amendment’s due 
process clause, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), and 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).  
But, over the course of nearly four decades, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly refused to recognize Bivens actions in 
any new contexts.  Cf. Carlson, 446 U.S. 14 (providing the 
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last set of novel circumstances in which the Court implied a 
Bivens action).   
 
The Supreme Court has never implied a Bivens action 
under any clause of the First Amendment.  See Reichle v. 
Howards, 566 U.S. 658 n.4 (2012) (“We have never held that 
Bivens extends to First Amendment claims.”).  Instead, it has, 
solely for analytical purposes, assumed that such an action 
exists.   It has not actually decided the matter.  See Wood v. 
Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2067 (2014) (“[W]e have several 
times assumed without deciding that Bivens extends to First 
Amendment claims.  We do so again in this case.” (internal 
citation omitted)).   
 
Our Court, on the other hand, has taken that step.  
First, in Paton v. La Prade, we held that a high school student 
who mailed an envelope to the Socialist Workers Party, and 
had her name and address recorded by the FBI as a result, 
could seek redress under Bivens for a violation of her First 
Amendment free speech rights.  524 F.2d 862, 870 (3d Cir. 
1975).  Then, in Milhouse v. Carlson, we extended Paton to 
imply a Bivens cause of action under the First Amendment for 
the denial of a prisoner’s right of access to the courts.  652 
F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir. 1981).  Recently, though, in George v. 
Rehiel, we took a more cautious approach and assumed 
without deciding that a Bivens action could exist to vindicate 
a First Amendment right to be free of government retaliation 
for speech.  738 F.3d 562, 585 n.24 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[W]e 
will proceed on the assumption that there is a Bivens cause of 
action for First Amendment retaliation claims.”).  We made 
that assumption, coincidentally, in the very context we now 





The present case compels us to decide the issue we 
assumed away in George.  The facts here require it.  
Moreover, as the role of the TSA has become prevalent in the 
lives of the traveling populace, disputes involving airport 
screening personnel may come up with some frequency, and 
the existence of a Bivens action for First Amendment 
retaliation is no longer something that we should assume 
without deciding.  Today we hold that Bivens does not afford 
a remedy against airport security screeners who allegedly 
retaliate against a traveler who exercises First Amendment 
rights.   
 
Our conclusion is informed by a long course of 
precedent.  Since our decisions in Paton and Milhouse 
permitting Bivens actions in certain First Amendment 
contexts, the Supreme Court has plainly counseled against 
creating new Bivens causes of action.8  The Court has 
explained that its recognition of a cause of action under a 
constitutional amendment does not mean that such an action 
can vindicate every violation of the rights afforded by that 
                                              
8 See, e.g., Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118 (2012) 
(refusing to extend Eighth Amendment Bivens action to 
individuals working at a private prison); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 
U.S. 471 (1994) (refusing to extend Bivens claim to federal 
agency defendant); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 
(1988) (refusing to extend Bivens to case involving wrongful 
denials of disability benefits); United States v. Stanley, 483 
U.S. 669 (1987) (refusing to extend Bivens to case involving 
injuries suffered incident to military service); Chappell v. 
Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (refusing to extend Bivens to 
case involving racial discrimination by superiors in military).   
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particular amendment.  Compare Davis, 442 U.S. at 243-44 
(permitting Bivens action against Congressman for violation 
of Fifth Amendment due process rights) with Schweiker v. 
Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 428-29 (1988) (refusing to permit 
Bivens action in social security context for violation of Fifth 
Amendment due process rights).  The recognition of a cause 
of action is context-specific.  As the Supreme Court said only 
last month, 
 
[a] case might differ in a meaningful way 
because of the rank of the officers involved; the 
constitutional right at issue; the generality or 
specificity of the official action; the extent of 
judicial guidance as to how an officer should 
respond to the problem or emergency to be 
confronted; the statutory or other legal mandate 
under which the officer was operating; the risk 
of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the 
functioning of other branches; or the presence 
of potential special factors that previous Bivens 
cases did not consider. 
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860 (2017).   
 
Our past pronouncements are thus not controlling in 
the specific circumstances now at issue.  It is not enough to 
argue, as Vanderklok does, that First Amendment retaliation 
claims have been permitted under Bivens before.  We must 
look at the issue anew in this particular context, airport 
security, and as it pertains to this particular category of 
defendants, TSA screeners.  Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68 (“[W]e 
have consistently refused to extend Bivens liability to any 




Since Bivens was decided, judicial attitudes about the 
creation of new causes of action have changed considerably.  
Courts will no longer imply rights and remedies as a matter of 
course, “no matter how desirable that might be as a policy 
matter, or how compatible with the statute [or constitutional 
provision].”  Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1856 (quoting Alexander v. 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001)); see also Ziglar, 137 S. 
Ct. at 1869 (Thomas, J. concurring) (“Bivens is a relic of the 
heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers 
to create causes of action.” (internal quotations omitted)).  
“Given the notable change in the [Supreme] Court’s approach 
to recognizing implied causes of action … the Court has 
made clear that expanding the Bivens remedy is now a 
‘disfavored’ judicial activity.”  Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1848 
(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)).  So, for 
decades, the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to extend 
Bivens actions beyond the specific clauses of the specific 
amendments for which a cause of action has already been 
implied, or even to other classes of defendants facing liability 
under those same clauses.  See, e.g., Wilkie, 551 U.S. 537 
(refusing to extend Bivens to invasion of property rights); 
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (refusing to extend Bivens to alleged 
Eighth Amendment violations by employees of private 
prisons); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 267, 390 (1983) (refusing to 
imply a First Amendment Bivens action against a federal 
employer).  Instead, it has established a rigorous inquiry that 
must be undertaken before implying a Bivens cause of action 
in a new context or against a new category of defendants.  
Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550.   
 
In accordance with that inquiry, as laid out in Wilkie v. 
Robbins, we must first ask “whether any alternative, existing 
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process for protecting the interest amounts to a convincing 
reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new 
and freestanding remedy in damages.”  Id.  Then, “even in the 
absence of an alternative, … ‘[we] must make the kind of 
remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law 
tribunal, paying particular heed … to any special factors 
counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of 
federal litigation.’”  Id. (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 378).  We 
turn to those questions next.   
 
B. No Alternative Process May Have Been 
Available. 
 
At the first step in the Wilkie analysis, we ask whether 
there is any “‘alternative, existing process’ capable of 
protecting the constitutional interests at stake.”  Minneci v. 
Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 125 (2012) (quoting Wilkie, 551 U.S. 
at 550).  Here, Vanderklok’s constitutional interest is in 
exercising his right to free speech at an airport security 
checkpoint without retaliation by a TSA screener.  
Vanderklok attempted to vindicate that constitutional interest 
by bringing state law and constitutional claims against both 
Kieser and the United States.  He asserted in his Amended 
Complaint that his state law claims could be brought against 
Kieser individually and against the United States under the 
FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity.  But the District 
Court held that the United States could substitute itself in 
place of Kieser as a defendant.  The Court then dismissed all 
claims against the United States, including those for which 
the United States had substituted itself in place of Kieser.  
Although those rulings are not before us, we take note of 
them as we determine whether remedies exist as an 




The United States can generally be substituted for 
federal employees facing liability for state law tort claims 
when they “are sued for damages for harms caused in the 
course of their employment[.]”  Hui v. Castaneda, 559 U.S. 
799, 801 (2010) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680).  
Once the United States substitutes itself for an individual 
defendant, the district courts only have jurisdiction to hear 
those claims if the United States has explicitly waived its 
sovereign immunity.  If it has, then it can be held liable under 
the FTCA for the acts or omissions of federal employees, but 
only if it would otherwise be liable under “the law of 
respondeat superior of the state in which the act or omission 
occurred.”  Lomando v. United States, 667 F.3d 363, 373 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (quoting McSwain v. United States, 422 F.2d 1086, 
1087-88 (3d Cir. 1970) (further citation omitted)).   
 
If the United States is sued in tort, or once the United 
States substitutes itself as a defendant in a tort case, the 
FTCA provides the exclusive avenue to relief, if any can be 
had.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (“The remedy against the 
United States provided by sections 1346(b) and 2672 of this 
title … is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for 
money damages[.]”).  The remedies available are either an 
administrative settlement, as allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 2672,9 
                                              
9 28 U.S.C. § 2672 provides, in relevant part, that: 
The head of each Federal agency or his 
designee, in accordance with regulations 
prescribed by the Attorney General, may 
consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, 
compromise, and settle any claim for money 
damages against the United States for injury or 
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or traditional tort damages, as afforded under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1346(b).10  There are two types of claims that are exempt 
from the general rule that the FTCA provides the exclusive 
means for relief: first, claims that are “brought for a violation 
of the Constitution of the United States,” and second, claims 
that are “brought for a violation of a statute of the United 
States under which such action against an individual is 
otherwise authorized.”  28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A) and (B).  
Since, at this point in the analysis, we are considering 
whether any alternatives to a Bivens action are available to 
                                                                                                     
loss of property or personal injury or death 
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or 
omission of any employee of the agency while 
acting within the scope of his office or 
employment, under circumstances where the 
United States, if a private person, would be 
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law 
of the place where the act or omission occurred 
 
10 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) provides, in relevant part, that:  
[T]he district courts … shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against 
the United States, for money damages, … for 
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or 
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or 
omission of any employee of the Government 
while acting within the scope of his office or 
employment, under circumstances where the 
United States, if a private person, would be 
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law 




remedy a constitutional violation, the first exemption does not 
advance our inquiry, as it simply notes that a Bivens action 
itself is available.  And because there is no explicit statutory 
violation at issue here, the second exception also provides no 
alternative remedy.  Vanderklok thus has only his state law 
claims as a possible alternative to a Bivens action.  But there 
is no waiver of immunity for state law claims brought against 
a government employee “acting within the scope of his office 
or employment[,]” except to the extent specified in the FTCA.  
Id. § 2679(b)(1).  That leaves Vanderklok to proceed with his 
state law claims against the government under either § 2672 
or § 1346(b).11   
 
Under § 2672, an agency is authorized to settle with 
claimants for money damages up to $25,000, or higher if 
approval from the Attorney General is obtained.  Here, 
Vanderklok did not obtain such a remedy.12  Therefore, he is 
left with whatever relief may exist under § 1346(b).  As noted 
earlier, see supra n.10, § 1346(b) provides that the district 
courts “shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on 
                                              
11 Section 1346(a) is inapplicable as it relates to “the 
recovery of … internal-revenue tax[.]”   
 
12 The record is unclear as to whether or not 
Vanderklok sought such an administrative settlement.  If he 
did, no mention is made of it.  We may presume that he did, 
however, since failure to pursue that administrative remedy 
would likely be grounds for dismissal in itself.  See McNeil v. 
United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“The FTCA bars 
claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have 




claims against the United States, for money damages … 
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any 
employee of the [g]overnment while acting within the scope 
of his office or employment[.]”  28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).  That 
section further provides that the government is liable for such 
damages “under circumstances where [it], if a private person, 
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of 
the place where the act or omission or occurred.”  Id.   
 
Even when the government can be sued under 
§ 1346(b), however, there are exceptions contained within 
§ 2680 that preclude the application of § 1346(b) to certain 
tort claims.  The exceptions laid out in § 2680 include a 
disclaimer of liability for the United States for “[a]ny claim 
arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract 
rights.”  28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).  That is known as the 
“intentional tort exception,”  Millbrook v. United States, 133 
S. Ct. 1441, 1443 (2013) (quotation omitted),  and 
Vanderklok’s state law tort claims – false arrest, false 
imprisonment, battery, assault, retaliatory prosecution,13 and 
                                              
13 It might be asked whether Vanderklok’s “PA State 
Retaliatory Prosecution” claim falls within that exception.  In 
our view, it does.  The Supreme Court has likened a 
retaliatory prosecution claim to the common law analogs of 
malicious prosecution and abuse of process, Hartman 547 
U.S. at 258 (“[W]e could debate whether the closer common-
law analog to retaliatory prosecution is malicious prosecution 
(with its no-probable-cause element) or abuse of process 
(without it).”), both of which are included explicitly within 
the statute.  In addition, we have interpreted the “arising 
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malicious prosecution – fall within that exception to the 
waiver of immunity.  So it would appear that Vanderklok is 
out of luck under the FTCA.  
 
But, in an added bit of complication, claims that fall 
within the intentional tort exception in that statute have 
another chance at survival because there is an exception to the 
exception that can bring them back within the waiver of 
sovereign immunity.  Section 2680(h) creates that second-
level exception “with regard to acts or omissions of 
investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States 
Government,” for any claim arising “out of assault, battery, 
false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or 
malicious prosecution.”  That is known as the “law 
enforcement proviso.”  Millbrook, 133 S. Ct. at 1444.  The 
FTCA defines an “investigative or law enforcement officer” 
as “any officer of the United States who is empowered by law 
to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for 
violations of Federal law.”  28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).   
 
Here, the District Court concluded that Kieser was not 
an investigative or law enforcement agent because he was not 
an “officer” of the United States under that definition.  
Vanderklok, 142 F. Supp. 3d at 361.  In reaching that 
                                                                                                     
under” language of the intentional tort exception broadly.  See 
Beneficial Consumer Disc. Co. v. Poltonowicz, 47 F.3d 91, 
96-97 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that a fraud claim falls within 
the intentional torts of “misrepresentation” and “deceit” listed 
in the exception).  Therefore, although not explicitly 
enumerated in the statute, retaliatory prosecution also falls 
within the intentional tort exception.   
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conclusion, the District Court first noted that, in other 
sections of the FTCA, Congress chose to use the term 
“federal employee” rather than “officer of the United States.”  
Id.  It therefore sought to determine when a TSA employee 
becomes an officer of the United States.  The Court found its 
answer in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, 
which created the TSA and designates as “law enforcement 
personnel” only those TSA agents who are “(1) authorized to 
carry and use firearms; (2) vested with the degree of the 
police power …; and (3) identifiable by appropriate indicia of 
authority.”  49 U.S.C. § 44903(a)(1)-(3).  Based on that, the 
District Court concluded that Kieser was a “federal 
employee[], who conduct[s] airport security screening;” not a 
“law enforcement officer[], who perform[s] various law 
enforcement functions.”14  Id.  Therefore, it held that the 
United States retained its sovereign immunity and that the 
state law claims had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  
Vanderklok, 142 F. Supp. 3d at 362.  The District Court’s 
decision about the applicability of the law enforcement 
proviso is not on appeal at this time, Vanderklok, 2015 WL 
12844282, at *2 (denying certification of an interlocutory 
appeal under Rule 54(b)), but the existence of that proviso is 
nevertheless important because it assures that, in cases where 
a TSA agent has been entrusted with the greater 
responsibilities of an investigative or law enforcement officer, 
a tort action will lie.    
                                              
14 As further support for that conclusion, the District 
Court relied on our statement in Matsko v. United States, that 
“employees of administrative agencies, no matter what 
investigative conduct they are involved in, do not come 
within the [law enforcement] exception.”  372 F.3d 556, 560 




In addition to the remedy that exists by virtue of the 
law enforcement proviso, we note that the United States 
would not be permitted to substitute itself as a defendant in 
the first place in cases where a government employee acted 
outside the scope of his duties.  28 U.S.C. § 2679(d).  In 
determining whether an employee was acting within or 
outside of the scope of his duties, we look to the law of the 
state in which the action took place.  CNA v. United States, 
535 F.3d 132, 146 (3d Cir. 2008), as amended (Sept. 29, 
2008).  In this case, that is Pennsylvania law, which 
incorporates the Second Restatement of Agency’s definition 
of conduct within the scope of employment.  Id.  “According 
to the Restatement, ‘conduct is within the scope of 
employment if, but only if: (a) it is the kind [the employee] is 
employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the 
authorized time and space limits [and] (c) it is actuated, at 
least in part, by a purpose to serve the master[.]’”  Brumfield 
v. Sanders, 232 F.3d 376, 380 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Restatement (Second) Agency § 228) (alterations in 
Brumfield).   
 
Whether it was proper to allow the substitution of the 
United States as the defendant in this suit, in place of Kieser, 
for Vanderklok’s state law claims is a question not now 
before us.15  We nevertheless note that, in extreme cases, the 
                                              
15 It would be particularly difficult to review whether 
Kieser was acting within the scope of his employment when 
he took the actions in this case, since that District Court did 
not address that issue before substituting and dismissing the 
claims against the United States.  Vanderklok v. United 
States, 142 F. Supp. 3d 356, 362 (E.D. Pa. 2015), appeal 
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United States would likely not be substituted as a defendant 
and thus claims against an egregiously erring government 
employee could not be dismissed on sovereign immunity 
grounds.  See Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 639-42 (3d Cir. 
1990) (allowing district courts to review whether defendant 
was acting within scope of employment before permitting 
substitution of United States and dismissal on sovereign 
immunity grounds) aff’d Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) 
(affirming on other grounds, without addressing issue of 
substitution).  Instead, we expect that in such cases the 
employee will not have acted within the scope of employment 
and therefore will face individual liability under state law.  
See Matsko v. United States, 372 F.3d 556, 558 n.5 (3d Cir. 
2004) (dismissing FTCA claims against United States for lack 
of jurisdiction where employee acted outside scope of 
employment while recognizing that a state law claim would 
proceed in state court).  So, although in such cases the United 
States would retain its sovereign immunity, state law tort 
claims against the individual could proceed.  That would 
provide an alternative remedy for an airline passenger who 
suffers as a result of a TSA screener’s actionable conduct 
outside the scope of his employment.  In instances where the 
TSA screener has acted within the scope of his employment, 
it is possible that no judicial remedy will exist if a Bivens 
action is not implied because the United States could 
substitute itself for the screener and claim sovereign 
immunity.  But that is by design.  Cf. United States v. Smith, 
499 U.S. 160, 166 (1991) (“Congress recognized that the 
required substitution of the United States as the defendant in 
                                                                                                     
dismissed (Feb. 8, 2016).  As a result, even if it were proper 
to consider the issue, there would be no record on which to do 
so at this time.   
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tort suits filed against Government employees would 
sometimes foreclose a tort plaintiff’s recovery altogether.”).   
 
In summary, then, there can be a remedy against the 
United States in cases where the employee had the 
responsibility of an officer, and there can be a state law 
remedy against the individual when the offending TSA 
employee acted outside the scope of employment.  Based on 
the District Court’s orders as they now stand, however, there 
are no alternative judicial remedies available to Vanderklok, 
because the District Court concluded that Kieser was not an 
investigative or law enforcement officer and there was no 
challenge as to whether Kieser acted within the scope of his 
employment.  
 
While an alternative judicial remedy is absent, there 
may be a non-judicial “alternative, existing process[.]”  
Minneci, 565 U.S. at 125 (quoting Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550).  
In 2007, Congress enacted a statute requiring the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to “establish a timely and fair process for 
individuals who believe they have been delayed or prohibited 
from boarding a commercial aircraft because they were 
wrongly identified as a threat … by the [TSA.]”  49 U.S.C. 
§ 44926(a).  Pursuant to that statutory requirement, the 
Department of Homeland Security established the Traveler 
Redress Inquiry Program (“TRIP”), which is administered by 
the TSA and “is essentially a clearinghouse for traveler 
grievances.”  Latif v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 
2012).  In practice, it appears that TRIP is primarily used as a 
method by which individuals can challenge their inclusion on 
the “No-Fly List” that is part of the government’s “Terrorist 
Screening Database.”  See Dept. of Homeland Sec. Office of 
Inspector Gen., Effectiveness of the Dept. of Homeland Sec. 
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Traveler Redress Program 35 (2009), 
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG-09-
103r_Sep09.pdf, (“Most TRIP redress requests stem from 
watch list misidentifications in commercial aviation security 
settings.”).16  Yet, by its terms, TRIP appears to provide an 
administrative mechanism by which Vanderklok could have 
chosen to pursue his complaint against Kieser because he was 
“delayed or prohibited from boarding a commercial aircraft 
because [he was] wrongly identified as a threat[.]”17  49 
U.S.C. § 44926(a).   
 
The TRIP website supports that understanding, stating 
that a person can use TRIP if they “were denied or delayed 
boarding” or believe they “were unfairly detained during 
[their] travel experience[.]”  Dept. of Homeland Sec., Should 
I Use DHS TRIP?, https://www.dhs.gov/step-1-should-i-use-
                                              
16 Although neither Vanderklok nor Kieser addressed 
the existence of this administrative scheme as an alternative, 
the government as amicus curiae brought it to our attention.  
To the extent that we rely on information beyond what the 
government included in its amicus brief, that information is 
publicly available on government websites and therefore we 
take judicial notice of it.  See Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. 
Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (“It is appropriate to 
take judicial notice of … information … made publicly 
available by government entities[.]”).   
  
17 Since neither Vanderklok nor Kieser addressed the 
existence of this administrative mechanism, we do not know 
whether Vanderklok attempted to avail himself of it.  If he 
knew of TRIP and chose not to avail himself of it, we do not 
have any explanation for that decision.   
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dhs-trip (last visited July 13, 2017).  Vanderklok was 
indisputably denied boarding because of a purported threat, 
and that alone appears sufficient to file a TRIP complaint.  He 
also believes he was detained unfairly.  The online complaint 
form, by its terms, permits passengers to submit complaints if 
they feel their “civil rights have been violated because [the] 
questioning or treatment during screening was abusive or 
coercive[.]”  Dept. of Homeland Sec. Traveler Redress 
Inquiry Program, https://trip.dhs.gov (last visited July 13, 
2017).  Therefore, it seems plain that an alternative 
administrative process exists for addressing claims such as 
Vanderklok’s.  Nonetheless, because the TRIP process 
appears to be used primarily as a means to challenge 
inclusion on terrorism watch lists, we will assume for the sake 
of discussion that it was not a meaningful remedy for 
Vanderklok in this case.   
 
C. There Are Special Factors Counseling 
Hesitation. 
 
Although it is possible that no alternative remedy 
exists for Vanderklok, that does not conclude our analysis 
because, “even in the absence of an alternative, a Bivens 
remedy is a subject of judgment[.]”  Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550; 
see also Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 804 F.3d 417, 425 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015) (refusing to imply a Bivens remedy, even where 
the government admitted the plaintiff had no alternative 
remedy).  In determining whether to imply a Bivens claim for 
First Amendment retaliation by TSA screeners, we must ask 
whether there are special factors counseling hesitation.  Id.  




Considering whether there are such factors, requires us 
to “weigh[] reasons for and against the creation of a new 
cause of action, the way common law judges have always 
done.”  Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 554.  The critical question is 
“‘who should decide’ whether to provide for a damages 
remedy, Congress or the courts?”  Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1857 
(quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 380).  Most often, the answer is 
Congress.  Id.  Because, “[w]hen an issue involves a host of 
considerations that must be weighed and appraised, it should 
be committed to those who write the laws rather than those 
who interpret them.”  Id. (internal quotations and citations 
omitted).  The government, as amicus, argues that that is the 
correct answer in this instance, pointing to the serious risks at 
stake in the context of airport security and the superior 
position Congress has in weighing those risks and deciding 
upon their management.   
 
The TSA was created in response to the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, specifically for the purpose of 
securing our nation’s airports and air traffic.  Transp. Workers 
Union of Am., AFL-CIO v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 492 F.3d 
471, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing Pub L. No. 107-71, 115 
Stat. 597 (2001) (codified in part at 49 U.S.C. § 44936 et 
seq.)).  A special factor counseling hesitation in implying a 
Bivens action here is that Vanderklok’s claims can be seen as 
implicating “the Government’s whole response to the 
September 11 attacks, thus of necessity requiring an inquiry 
into sensitive issues of national security.”  Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. 
at 1861.   
 
“The Supreme Court has never implied a Bivens 
remedy in a case involving the military, national security, or 
intelligence.”  Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390, 394 (D.C. Cir. 
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2012).  To the contrary, it has recognized that “[m]atters 
intimately related to foreign policy and national security are 
rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention.”  Haig v. 
Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981).  In recognition of that, 
national security decisions, insofar as they relate to foreign 
relations18 and the military,19 have, to a large extent, been 
                                              
18 “The political question doctrine excludes from 
judicial review those controversies which revolve around 
policy choices and value determinations constitutionally 
committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the 
confines of the Executive Branch.”  Japan Whaling Ass’n v. 
Am. Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).  That does not 
exclude from judicial review all cases touching on issues of 
foreign relations, but it does exclude those that are not 
susceptible to judicial determination in “light of [the] nature 
and posture [of the foreign relations question] in the specific 
case, and of the possible consequences of judicial action.”  
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962).  
 
19 In Feres v. United States, the Supreme Court held 
that “the Government is not liable under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise 
out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.”  340 
U.S. 135, 146 (1950).  “[T]he Feres doctrine has been applied 
consistently to bar all suits on behalf of service members 
against the Government based upon service-related injuries.”  
United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 687-88 (1987).  In 
addition, “[t]he complex subtle, and professional decisions as 
to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a 
military force are essentially professional military 
judgments,” and therefore challenges to those judgments are 
nonjusticiable.  Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973); 
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insulated from judicial review.  And our sister circuits have 
relied on the hesitancy of the Supreme Court to intrude on 
national security matters in refusing to imply Bivens actions.20  
Although there is no doctrine depriving us of jurisdiction, the 
                                                                                                     
see also Harris v. Kellog Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 724 F.3d 
458, 478 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining that whether an issue is 
justiciable “turns on whether a strategic military decision 
must be reviewed”).   
 
20 See, e.g. Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 804 F.3d 417, 
426 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Matters touching on national security 
and foreign policy fall within an area of executive action 
where courts hesitate to intrude absent congressional 
authorization.”); Mirmehdi v. United States, 689 F.3d 975, 
982-83 (9th Cir. 2012) (refusing to extend Bivens to 
immigration issues because such issues tend to affect foreign 
policy and national security); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 
193, 200 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (refusing to extend Bivens 
against Secretary of Defense for mistreatment of military 
detainees abroad because, although it would “lead the 
Secretary to hold the rights of detainees in higher regard[,] … 
that change would come at an uncertain cost in national 
security”); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 575 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(refusing to extend Bivens to the detention and transfer of an 
individual to Syria because it touches upon national security 
and thus “fall[s] within ‘an area of executive action in which 
courts have long been hesitant to intrude’ absent 
congressional authorization.” (emphasis in Arar) (quoting 
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993) (further quotations 
omitted)); Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(concluding political question doctrine did not bar review, but 
that Bivens should not extend to a national security context).    
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reluctance of the Supreme Court to weigh in on issues of 
national security strongly suggests that we too should hesitate 
to create a remedy when those issues are in play.  See Dept. of 
Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (explaining that the 
presumption in favor of appellate review “runs aground when 
it encounters concerns of national security”); cf. Bush, 462 
U.S. at 379-80 (recognizing that the Supreme Court has 
generally been hesitant to imply a damages remedy not 
explicitly provided by Congress where such a remedy would 
interfere with other branches of government (citing United 
States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947), and United 
States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954))).   
 
The hesitancy to imply a Bivens remedy in a case with 
national security implications must be particularly 
“pronounced when the judicial inquiry comes in the context 
of a claim seeking money damages rather than a claim 
seeking injunctive or other equitable relief.”  Ziglar, 137 S. 
Ct. at 1861.  That is because “[n]ational-security policy is the 
prerogative of the Congress and President[,]” and imposing 
damages liability would likely interfere with that prerogative 
by “caus[ing] an official to second-guess difficult but 
necessary decisions concerning national-security policy.”  Id.   
 
Here, Vanderklok asks us to imply a Bivens action for 
damages against a TSA agent.  TSA employees like Kieser 
are tasked with assisting in a critical aspect of national 
security – securing our nation’s airports and air traffic.  The 
threat of damages liability could indeed increase the 
probability that a TSA agent would hesitate in making split-
second decisions about suspicious passengers.  In light of 
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Supreme Court precedent, past and very recent, that is surely 
a special factor that gives us pause.21   
 
In addition to that, we must recognize that “‘Congress 
is in a far better position than a court to evaluate the impact of 
a new species of litigation’ against those who act on the 
public’s behalf.”  Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 562 (quoting Bush, 462 
U.S. at 389).  “And Congress can tailor any remedy to the 
problem perceived[.]”  Id.  (citing Bush, 462 U.S. at 389).  
That is especially compelling here, as Congress chose to limit 
the scope of judicial review of TSA actions.  In creating the 
                                              
21 In Ziglar v. Abbasi, decided last month, detainees 
held in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks 
brought suit against federal officials and wardens of their 
detention facility, claiming that they were abused and 
subjected to excessive detention in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment.  137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).  The Supreme Court 
recognized that it had previously implied a Bivens action 
under the Fifth Amendment and for vindication of prisoners’ 
rights under the Eighth Amendment, but concluded that the 
case presented a new context because it differed from 
previous Bivens cases in a meaningful way.  Id. at 1859.  
Ultimately, the Court noted that “[n]ational-security policy is 
the prerogative of the Congress and President[,]” id. at 1861, 
and that “Congress’ failure to provide a damages remedy 
might be more than mere oversight.”  Id. at 1862.  Therefore, 
in part to preserve the separation of powers, it refused to 
imply a Bivens remedy and instead left the matter to 
Congress.  Id. at 1861-63.  We have had the advantage of 
seeing this most recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court, 




TSA, Congress restricted judicial review to affirming, 
amending, modifying, or setting aside orders of the agency.  
49 U.S.C. § 46110(c).  When courts do review such orders, 
the findings of fact made by the TSA are conclusive, if 
supported by substantial evidence.  49 U.S.C. § 46110(c); 
Ickes v. F.A.A., 299 F.3d 260, 264 (3d Cir. 2002).22   
 
Furthermore, we cannot ignore that remedies in the 
airport security context are circumscribed as a direct result of 
                                              
22 Another reason to believe that Congress may have 
thought about whether to permit suits against TSA employees 
and chose not to do so is because it decided to insulate from 
review personnel decisions regarding those employees.  
Congress has granted the Under Secretary of Transportation 
for Security full discretion to “employ, appoint, discipline, 
terminate, and fix the compensation, terms, and conditions of 
employment of Federal service for such a number of 
individuals as the Under Secretary determines to be necessary 
to carry out the screening functions of the Under Secretary.”  
49 U.S.C. § 44935 note, Pub. L. 107-71, title I, §111(d), 115 
Stat. 620 (2001), as amended by Pub. L. 112-171, § 1(a), 126 
Stat. 1306 (2012).  Courts have decided that the discretion 
thus granted precludes judicial review of personnel decisions 
regarding security screeners, those matters being left entirely 
to the Administrator of the TSA.  See Conyers v. Rossides, 
558 F.3d 137, 144-45 (2d Cir. 2009) (joining every other 
court that has decided the issue in concluding that judicial 
review of personnel decisions is foreclosed).  Therefore, 
although our review in this case is not expressly limited, 
Congressionally-enacted restrictions on judicial review 
further counsel against creating a damages remedy against 
TSA security screeners. 
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Congressional decisions.  See Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1862 
(“Congress’ failure to provide a damages remedy might be 
more than mere oversight, and that congressional silence 
might be more than ‘inadvertent.’”  (quoting Schweiker, 487 
U.S. at 423)).  Congress decided the scope of tort liability for 
the government and government employees and Congress 
allowed the creation of an administrative mechanism by 
which to adjudicate certain TSA complaints.  See Bush, 462 
U.S. at 388 (refusing to discount an administrative scheme 
simply because it did not provide complete relief to the 
plaintiff).  We should hesitate to create new remedies when it 
appears that the available ones are limited by Congressional 
design.   
 
Finally, there is a practical concern with establishing a 
court-crafted remedy in the circumstances presented here.  
TSA employees typically are not law enforcement officers 
and do not act as such.  As previously discussed, only those 
TSA employees specifically designated by the Under 
Secretary with the responsibilities of an officer, in accordance 
with 49 U.S.C. § 44903(a), operate like police officers.  As a 
result, line TSA employees are not trained on issues of 
probable cause, reasonable suspicion, and other constitutional 
doctrines that govern law enforcement officers.  See 49 
C.F.R. § 1542.213 (delineating mandatory training).  Instead, 
they are instructed to carry out administrative searches and 
contact local law enforcement if they encounter situations 
requiring action beyond their limited though important 
responsibilities.  Cf. 49 C.F.R. § 1542.215 (providing for 
“[u]niformed law enforcement personnel in the number and 
manner adequate to support” passenger screenings).  Since a 
First Amendment retaliatory prosecution claim hinges, in 
part, on whether the allegedly offending government 
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employee had probable cause to take some enforcement 
action, Hartman, 547 U.S. at 259-66, a Bivens claim is poorly 
suited to address wrongs by line TSA employees.  Indeed, the 
inherent uncertainty surrounding the probable cause standard 
is itself a factor counseling hesitation.  See Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. 
1864-65 (distinguishing the case from Carlson, in part, 
because the constitutional standard was unclear, thus 
affording less judicial guidance for defendants).    
 
Ultimately, the role of the TSA in securing public 
safety is so significant that we ought not create a damages 
remedy in this context.  The dangers associated with aircraft 
security are real and of high consequence.  Cf. Chappell v. 
Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) (refusing to imply a 
Bivens action where “the need for unhesitating and decisive 
action … would be undermined by a judicially created 
remedy”).  We, of course, do not suggest that TSA screeners 
should act with disdain for passenger rights or that they can 
escape all the consequences of their bad behavior.  Discipline 
by the government should be swift and certain, when its 
employees’ actions warrant it.  But, when it comes to creating 
judicial remedies, there must be a balancing of priorities, and 
“[t]he proper balance is one for the Congress, not the 
Judiciary, to undertake.”  Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1863.  
Otherwise, in this context, there is reason to “fear that a 
general Bivens cure would be worse than the disease.”  
Wilkie, 551. U.S. at 561.  Accordingly, in the specific context 
of airport security screeners, special factors preclude us from 
implying a Bivens cause of action for First Amendment 






 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse in part and 
remand to the District Court with an instruction to enter 
judgment for Kaiser on the First Amendment retaliation 
claim, and will decline to exercise jurisdiction over the 
remainder of the appeal.   
